Transformation and Constitution - An Examination of Enculturated Cognition

Introduction

Philosophers of mind seek to understand not just the organisation of cognitive systems, but also what constitutes them. Internalists favour the claim that cognitive processes are reducible to the brain. However, recent challenges to this view have sparked the imagination of many. The idea? What if cognition isn’t restricted to the boundaries of the brain - what if it extends out into the world?

This exciting departure from traditional cognitive science has resulted in the development of a range of interrelated theories (known as the 4E positions, with additions). In what follows, I will argue that enculturated cognition is the most convincing of these, before aiming to demonstrate that accepting the bulk of this theory is compatible with rejecting the fundamental claim of the extended mind theory - considered the most radical of them all.

The Crux of the Issue

Clark & Chalmers’ (2008) extended mind theory provides ample opportunity to comprehend the issue at stake. Their theory was a natural successor to functionalism and the representational theory of mind - specifically the argument for multiple realizability in computational systems.

If - thought some - an abstract function can be realised by multiple material substrates (like the same maths solution being produced using a calculator and a human brain), then why can’t other abstract mental functions (that partly constitute the mind), also be realised by multiple material substrates, aside from the brain?

The question seems a reasonable one, but what does it entail when we unpack it? When we drill down into Clark & Chalmers’ (2008) active externalism and parity principle, we are left with the metaphysically extravagant claim that our mind is actually partly constituted by resources in our environment that meet certain criteria, which could feasibly include tools like our smartphones. Are our smartphones really a part of our mind?

Enculturated Cognition, Introduced

The above example of active externalism is the most radical of the 4E and additional views, taking the externalist concept to “giddy heights” (Menary 2015, p.2). I will now introduce a position that, while admittedly less exciting, I consider to capture what is important and most likely true about the externalist trend in cognitive science - enculturated cognition. This view is appealing because it combines strong empirical evidence, evolutionary timescales and important socio-cultural practices to present a theory that I believe captures the essence of what makes the 4E views attractive, without being as radical as the active extended mind view (Fabry 2017; Menary 2015)

Enculturated Cognition, Explained

Enculturation is best understood as the cognitive transformation we undergo during the acquisition of socio-culturally structured practices - like learning to read (Fabry 2017). It’s associated with “significant changes of the organization and connectivity of the brain,” (Fabry 2017, p.349), and it relies on “cumulative cultural evolution and on the socially distributed acquisition of cognitive norms governing the engagement with epistemic resources.” (Fabry 2017, p.349).

Here’s an example to illustrate what that means: You have a skill and a resource you can draw on, which is: ‘the ability to read documents that are written in English.’ This skill seems ‘wired’ into your brain - you don’t need to exert a lot of effort to use it.

But how did this skill get there? On the enculturation view, it is the result of hundreds of thousands of years of evolution, during which time our species learnt to communicate, develop languages, write and form cohesive societies with structures that allowed for the transference of knowledge from generation to generation, and because you are part of a social group where the socio-cultural norm is to teach people how to read the English language.

The Central Argument

Empirical evidence suggests that when we learn to read, we undergo something called learning driven plasticity (LDP), which is “a potent principle governing ontogenetic brain development, according to which structural changes of the organization and connectivity of brain areas lead to new neuronal functions.” (Fabry 2017, p.349; Menary 2015).

Empirical and conceptual work on neural reuse and neuronal recycling suggest that the brain directs old neurons towards new tasks related to the organism’s present socio-cultural environment. (Fabry 2017). This is a particularly important argument in favour of enculturated cognition, because if your brain is literally transformed by evolutionary and socio-cultural factors then it would seem those factors form part of a system of which your cognition - your mind, is a part. If your mind is a part of that system and has been transformed by it, it seems conceivable that system could form part of the architecture of your mind.

Objections

I will now use Menary’s (2015) example of performing a complex mathematical operation to examine what I consider to be the two strongest arguments against enculturated cognition. The first is the internalist claim that when somebody uses an external tool to perform operations on long sequences of complex symbols, they are simply using a tool (a proof, in this instance) to momentarily assist their cognitive function - which still takes place solely inside of the brain (Menary 2015).

Menary responds that this kind of “mathematical cognition is constituted by these bouts of symbol manipulation, and we cannot simply shrink the system back to the brain.” (Menary 2015, p.16). I agree on this point - I believe that at that point in time, the proof becomes part of a system of cognition that the person uses to solve the problem.

A secondary objection is related, and comes from the position of the scaffolding theorist - who sympathises with the spirit of the enculturated cognition view, but differs on an important point - the claim that the evolutionary and socio-cultural elements that shape cognition are merely scaffolds, and do not actually constitute the mind (Sterelny 2010). The scaffolding theorist may at this time claim that the above-mentioned subject is using an impermanent scaffold to assist them in performing the operation, but as it’s an impermanent ‘prop’, so to speak, it doesn’t constitute the mind (Menary 2015). Menary refutes this by stating that Sterelny can endorse this idea, but what he can’t do is deny that removing the ability to physically manipulate mathematical symbols will not make a difference to mathematical cognition, he cannot deny that cognitive practices actually “transform our mathematical abilities” (Menary 2015, p.16).

It seems to me that for both objections, the point turns on the notion of the mind’s ability to interact with its environment and transform as a result, as opposed to simply being ‘assisted,’ or ‘shaped.’ In these cases, both the internalist and the scaffolding theorist are unwilling to concede the all-important point of constitution, in the way that Menary does (Menary 2015).

Are They Compatible?

I suspect that a slightly weaker form of enculturated cognition would be compatible with a rejection of the active externalism constitution claim made by Clark and Chalmers (2008). In 2007, Menary introduced a concept he called cognitive integration (CI). In 2015, he called CI a framework that is a “process of enculturation” (Menary 2015, p.2), that involves “multiple cognitive layers where neural, bodily, and environmental processes all conspire to complete cognitive tasks.” (Menary 2015, p.2).

He notes that Sterelny, as a scaffolding theorist, can “agree with the bulk of the framework provided by CI whilst avoiding the constitutive claim.” (Menary 2015, p.16). Considering CI and encultured cognition are often implied to be analogous throughout the text, I am left with the following question: If this is possible for CI, is it possible for encultured cognition itself?

This position would seem to allow for a proper accommodation of the evolutionary and socio-cultural transformation of the brain (greater than that of situated cognition), while just falling short of the more radical claim that our social practices constitute part of our minds. This position would certainly mirror my intuitions on the matter, though further examination and explanatory work would no doubt be required to see if a compatibilism of that order could stack up.

Conclusion

I have argued that our minds are not just shaped, but are actively transformed by evolutionary and socio-cultural factors. While I think we should resist the more radical, active externalist view proposed by Clark and Chalmers (2008), I have demonstrated that enculturated cognition has empirical support and appears to do the theoretical explanatory work behind learning driven plasticity. I have considered opposing views and found that if scaffolding theorists may be able to agree with the bulk of CI, yet avoid constitution, then perhaps a slightly weaker or altered version of enculturated cognition would be compatible with a rejection of a full endorsement of constitution. But overall, I have argued that of the main approaches to extended mind, enculturated cognition is closest to the mark. While we may be centuries (or longer) away from a complete theory of the mind, I suspect that, aside from leading us towards important insights now, the contribution enculturated cognition will ultimately make to this future theory will be not be insignificant.

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