Adequate Determinism and Ultimate Responsibility

Introduction

Free will and determinism are philosophical theories that hold conflicting ideas about what really drives human choices. Compatibilism is a position that seeks to reconcile the two by claiming they can co-exist. In what follows, I will define each theory. Then, I will demonstrate that free will in a strong sense is not compatible with determinism. 

From there, I will articulate and defend my own position: Adequate determinism exists, therefore free will in the strong sense does not exist. As free will in the strong sense is required for the legitimacy of moral responsibility, an acceptance of adequate determinism necessitates skepticism towards ultimate moral responsibility.  

Free Will 

To begin, I shall provide a brief explanation of free will. Broadly defined, it is the notion that rational human beings (referred to as agents), have a capacity to choose from a range of alternative options (O’Connor 2016). Kane (2009) suggests that there are two conditions which must be met for free will to exist. Firstly, the agent must have been able to do otherwise, and secondly, the agent must be the ultimate source of their choice. To understand these conditions, it’s helpful to use a real life scenario. Imagine a student about to take a test who has the opportunity to cheat. The student chooses in the moment to cheat. To meet the criteria for free will, it must be the case that the student really could have chosen not to cheat. In addition, the decision to cheat must have originated fully with the student, as in, the decision cannot be traced back to another source. As we go about our day-to-day lives, it certainly feels as though we weigh up different options and freely make choices about how to act. However, while it may seem intuitive, this conception of free will faces a strong challenge from the theory of determinism.

Determinism

I now turn to outlining determinism and the problem it poses for free will. This theory holds that all states of the world are predetermined by prior events, operating in accordance with the laws of physics (Kane 2009, McKenna & Coates 2016). This means that everything in the world (including the events in our lives), is already set in motion by forces outside of our control. Determinism claims that as human beings are made of physical matter, we are subject to the natural laws of the universe. If we return to the example above, of the student cheating on the test, determinism holds that the ultimate source of that choice was not the student herself. Instead, the choice was predetermined by factors outside of the student’s control, that all led up to that exact moment. These could include the genetic and environmental influences that had been operating on her since birth, and prior events that shaped her character and values. It could also include the influence of chance events that happened just prior to the test, for example, the sudden onset of a migraine, or reading mean comments on social media. The point determinists try to make is that every choice we make is influenced by factors that are ultimately outside of our control. It is difficult to argue that determinism is completely true, as quantum physics seems to show that some elementary particles behave in an unpredictable fashion (Kane 2009, McKenna & Coates 2016). However, as noted by Hoefer (2016), most philosophers agree that an adequate version of determinism exists.

Compatibilism

I shall now outline the theory that aims to reconcile free will and determinism, as well as two key arguments for it. Compatibilists claim that determinism does not pose a serious threat to free will, and that the two can co-exist (McKenna & Coates 2016). A central argument for this claim, as noted by Kane (2009), is that even if determinism is true, there is still an important difference between cases where freedom is obviously restricted (by things like physical restraint or addiction), and cases where it is not. The idea here is that there are levels of freedom in the real world that exist even if determinism is true, and these are the kinds of freedom that are important to us. A second argument comes from Dennett (1984), who claims that determinism doesn’t pose a threat to free will, or at least not to any free will “worth wanting” (Kane 2009, p. 27, taken from Dennett 1984). What Dennett is saying here is that it’s not worth arguing over the kind of ultimate, metaphysical free will that determinism precludes, because it simply doesn’t apply to us and is practically inconceivable. 

Moral Responsibility

Now I will aim to demonstrate that the above two arguments for compatibilism share a distinct feature which leaves them vulnerable to objections. This feature is that they endorse a version of free will that is not strong enough to support our current practices of assigning moral responsibility. For example, they are not strong enough for the retributive justification of punishment that underpins our current criminal justice system (Matravers 2007). This is important, because, as Kane notes, “many philosophers actually define free will as that kind of freedom required to assign true moral responsibility (and hence genuine praiseworthiness and blameworthiness) on agents” (Kane 2009 p. 21). What this means is that for many philosophers, for a person to be truly deserving of praise or blame, they must be responsible for their actions in a metaphysical sense, which is to say they must be the true and ultimate source of their actions. 

A Possible Contradiction

The following contradiction now seems to arise: If you are a compatibilist, by definition, you accept determinism, so you accept that our actions are ultimately predetermined by forces outside of our control. If we return to the compatibilist arguments above, we can see that the kind of free will they are defending is the kind that exists within a deterministic system. The logical conclusion here seems to be that if you are a compatibilist, you endorse a version of free will that is not the strong, “responsibility-entailing” kind (Kane 2009 p. 23). It is not that kind because, as a compatibilist, you already support the notion that it is the past combined with the laws of physics that predetermines events. This entails that an agent is not the ultimate source of her actions. 

The Implications 

I’ll explain the implications of this idea a little further. Firstly, it’s important to note that I am not claiming that compatibilism is necessarily false. It is possible to have a justifiable compatibilist position, but it seems to require accepting that the free will you endorse is not the “true responsibility-entailing” kind (Kane 2009 p. 23). Therefore, if you endorse compatibilism, it would be inconsistent to claim that ultimate moral responsibility exists. To do so would involve accepting a contradiction: that an agent is the ultimate source of her actions, and that factors outside of an agent’s control are the ultimate source of her actions. Therefore, endorsing compatibilism requires accepting a weaker version of free will and necessitates skepticism towards ultimate moral responsibility. 

Objection

The main objection I anticipate to this claim is that notions of strong free will and ultimate moral responsibility are required for social order and an effective criminal justice system. To that I respond that we would be justified in retaining practices of praise, blame and punishment insofar as they are useful in achieving a safe and orderly society. For example, our current criminal justice system has four aims of punishment: containment, deterrence, reform and retribution (Matravers 2007). If we deny free will in the strong sense, only retribution would become difficult to justify, because it is based on the notion that a person truly deserves punishment. The other three aims would remain justified and provide a framework for a criminal justice system that meets our requirements for safety and social order (Matravers 2007 & Caruso 2017). 

A Possible Solution

Norway is already operating a criminal justice system that emphasises restorative, as opposed to retributive justice (Caruso 2017). Some evidence shows that this system is working effectively. Norway’s recidivism rates (how many criminals reoffend once released) averages about 20%, whereas the US (which has a strongly retributive system), has one of the highest recidivism rates in the world at 76.6% (Caruso 2017 p.22). Caruso goes on to suggest that one of the main reasons for the difference in recidivism rates is that in Norway, the system is more focused on rehabilitation and reintegrating offenders back into society, whereas in the US, the system puts more emphasis on ensuring an offender gets what they deserve, which often leads to harsher sentences or conditions, like solitary confinement (Caruso 2017).  

Conclusion

If you are a materialist, and believe that human beings are entirely physical and therefore subject to natural laws, then the theory of adequate determinism put forth by contemporary physics is convincing. As I have shown, an acceptance of this theory involves recognising that human beings are not the ultimate source of their actions. Therefore, it is highly likely that human beings do not exercise free will in the strong, responsibility-entailing sense described by Kane (2009). However, my position leaves room for a compatibilism that accepts that the free will it endorses is a weaker version. While this seems to necessitate a rejection of ultimate moral responsibility, it does not close off opportunities for practices of moral responsibility. Indeed, it is possible that our institutions that operate on principles of moral responsibility may become more effective once they are not underpinned by notions of desert. 

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